邢唷��>� ��欹�M ��bjbj�=�= ￥€W€W焺�-��l��$$$Dh€��<�h慇,��"��@@@@@@@$紹軩�6@$��N��6@-�.�$uK@---� �$@-�@-~-�n>x�J$�?�烂>皋h� �N|? �?Ta@0慇�? 丒-丒�?-hh�� SAMPLE ESSAY: DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE Should Justice be 慏istributive�? Exploring the theories of Rawls, van Parijs, Walzer, and Nozick. Our World The richest 5% of the world抯 people have incomes 114 times those of the poorest 5%. Using purchasing power parity, the World Bank estimates that in 1998 1.2 billion people world-wide had consumption levels below $1 a day -- 24 percent of the population of the developing world and 2.8 billion lived on less than $2 a day. In Canada in 1999, 10% of family units with the highest net worth held just over half (53%) of all personal wealth in the country. The 10% at the low end of the net worth scale actually had negative net worth; they owed more than they owned. The top 20% of family units held 70% of all personal wealth in the country and the bottom 20% owned almost 0% of personal wealth in the country. In 1995, Aboriginal people in Canada had an average income from all sources of $15,700, just 62% of the figure for the non-Aboriginal population ($25,400). In 1995, 46% of all Aboriginal people had incomes below $10,000, compared with 27% of the non-Aboriginal population. Introduction Looking at the statistics on p.i, one can抰 help but ask: 慔ow did we get here?� and, 慦hat can we do about these huge inequalities?� In short, these are not the sort of statistics that are acceptable in a just society. It is no great surprise then that much of the discussion around political justice is framed in distributive terms. Distributive justice is essentially about societal equality. The question remains whether this view of justice is the right one. By focusing in on the distributive element of justice, are there important non-distributive questions of justice that are being left out? Are there elements of a just society that should not be framed in distributive terms? In order to fully evaluate the usefulness of defining justice as distributive, I will try to explore the 憁ainstream� definition of distributive justice, and then hold it up against theories that may not see justice as primarily distributive in any meaningful sense. I will primarily explore the justice theories of four authors: John Rawls, Michael Walzer, Robert Nozick and Philip van Parijs. These authors will discuss the variations on their views of equality of the distribution of goods versus liberty, and their views on the substantive versus procedural nature of justice. This will form the framework I will use to analyze the value of defining justice as distributive. I will finally conclude that most, if not all, justice questions at this point in history must be predominately substantively distributive that holds equality as foundational to freedom. But before I begin to outline the four theories, it is important to summarize the framework I will use to evaluate distributive justice. When we think about political justice in a modern, western, capitalist, democratic society, we think about issues of equality and liberty. Usually, it is a discussion around the moral equality of human beings at some fundamental level and their inherent right to live the life that they, as individual, see fit. Justice is what is derived from these two elements and political justice is how the state relates to its citizens regarding these two elements � if either the liberty or equality of its citizens is out of balance, justice is compromised. Thus, justice as a balance of liberty and equality has many interpretations. In addition, in a modern democratic state, issues of legitimacy are paramount in justice issues. Such strong emphasis is being placed on legitimacy in the current culture that justice is proposed as analogous with, or presupposing, legitimacy. Various versions of this theory exists, but all heavily equate justice with the process used to define justice. Thus, questions of who is involved in the process, and the context that they are in, are very important to this proceduralist theory. The rationalist, on the other hand, believes there is a substantive, morally right answer to the question of justice. This 慴est solution� is reachable by an outside, rational means and in the perfect sense, does not explicitly worry if it is legitimated by 憈he people�. They argue that people agreeing to something (justice) doesn抰 make it is the right answer. Social contact theorists typically try to walk the line between the procedural and substantive theories. With this framework in mind, I will begin with Rawls� theory of distributive justice. Rawls Rawls, the foremost liberal distributive justice theorist, draws from the notion that the afore-mentioned Canadian and global statistics (p.i) are intuitively unjust. He justifies this claim by arguing that individuals situated behind a veil of ignorance would agree that such an unequal society is unfair. Thus, justice for Rawls is distributive. This does not mean that distributive justice must be about rectifying inequalities through redistributing income for Rawls. Rather, distribution is about primary goods defined as 搘hat persons need in their status as free and equal citizens, and as normal and fully cooperating members of society over a complete life.� [Rawls, xiii] In other words, things like rights, opportunities, liberties, and 憇elf-respect�. Unequal distribution of wealth is not bad in and of itself, but bad because it leads to inequality of the basic goods needed to live a good life. Therefore we can assess whether a state is just or not by assessing the distribution of basic goods. Although justice at its most foundational is intuitive for Rawls, he also recognizes the value in incorporating a procedural element into his theory though his 憆eflective equilibrium� and the 憊eil of ignorance�. He argues that individuals realize the benefits of social cooperation but cooperation can only benefit all individuals in society when it exists under fair terms: A set of principles is required for choosing among the various social arrangements which determine this division of advantages and for underwriting an agreement on the proper distributive shares. These principles are the principles of social justice; they provide a way of assigning rights and duties in the basic institutions of society and they define the appropriate distribution of benefits and burdens of social co-operation. [Rawls, 4] These individuals draw from their intuitive notion of justice in order to create the fair social rules. Individuals would accept social rules if they are just, 揺ven at the cost of their own interests in particular situations, provided that others also accept those terms.� [Rawls, 132] Drafting these social principles is a process of 憆eflective equilibrium�. The specifics of what that entails is worked out behind the veil where true equality of individuals in this situation would allow them to choose the principles that would result in truly fair distribution of social advantages in society. Restrictions for this procedure are: no one knows their specific positions in society, people in the position are self-interested, no one can get everything that they want, people have a sense of justice, and people can do better by cooperation than by 慻oing it alone�. It is in this way, argues Rawls, that the principles that are reached are fair, or, the best that any of them are going to do. Reflective equilibrium, 搃s a state of affairs in which the parties are equally represented as moral persons and the outcome is not conditioned by arbitrary contingencies of the relative balance of social forces. Thus justice as fairness is able to use the idea of pure procedural justice from the beginning.� [Rawls, 104] When the conditions are fair: 卼he fundamental agreements reached in it are fair. This explains the propriety of the name 慾ustice as fairness�: it conveys the idea that the principles of justice are agreed to in an initial situation that is fair. The name does not mean that the concepts of justice and fairness are the same, anymore than the phrase 憄oetry as metaphor� means that the concepts of poetry and metaphor are the same. [Rawls, 11] In other words, the procedure cannot be equated with the outcome in this case. And, the original position is not meant to be anything more than a hypothetical exercise that can allow us to tap into our intuitive, common notions of justice. The notions of justice are indeed independent of the 慺air� method that was used to expose them and thus, the procedure is a tool that unveils the truth of distributive justice. On the other hand, once Rawls� two principles of justice have been allowed to surface through reflective equilibrium, procedural justice is re-introduced as a methodology to assess the real justice in a society. Inequalities in society are allowed to exist as long as they are derived from the two principles of justice. In essence, following the procedure outlined in the two principles will evaluate and create a just society. For example, in Rawls� discussion regarding fair equality of opportunity he discusses pure procedural justice as the method to employ this part of his second principle. 揟he intuitive idea is to design the social system so that the outcome is just whatever it happens to be, at least so long as it is within a certain range.� [Rawls, 74] Without an independent criterion for the right result, we look instead to 揳 correct or fair procedure such that the outcome is likewise correct or fair, whatever it is, provided the procedure has been properly followed.� [Rawls,75] Although gambling is 慺air� in that everyone enters into it freely and has an equal chance of winning, we cannot possibly know whether the game is just by looking at the distributive results at the end of the game in isolation of the rules. There is nothing contained in the end result that tells us a fair procedure was used to get it. So Rawls is re-introducing a procedural aspect to justify distributive inequalities in a society (so long as they arise following his two principles). Inequality as a concept in and of itself is not enough to trigger distributive procedures for Rawls. However, the interesting part of this insight is that severe inequalities, when there are a large number of people below subsistence level and a small percentage of people who are outrageously wealthy, will be a very large clue that the structures and systems that are in place are no longer functioning properly. Thus, it is the outcomes that fundamentally we use to determine the justness of the process. It is not just only because the process used to come up with it is fair, but also because of independent reasoning. Rawls� theory of justice has a jumping off point that originates in the unjust distribution of good in society and yet he is arguing that if his procedure is followed, the outcome must be fair. So it is not clear if it is the drastic inequality in and of itself that bothers Rawls, or rather the inequality combined with the systems that cause and reinforce those inequalities. This may be why he seems to want to give the process and the substantive claims of justice equal footing. 揑n justice as fairness, then, the guidelines of public reason and the principles of justice have essentially the same grounds. They are companion parts of one agreement.� [Rawls, 104] In other words, he understands the value of both procedural and substantive justice. Van Parijs Distributive justice in the powerful Rawlsian fashion is fundamentally re-distributive but the difference principle and the equality of opportunity principle work to rectify inequalities after they happen. A solid criticism of this form of distributive justice is that rather than dealing with the problem at the root, it is a band-aid solution. Van Parijs argues that we need to focus on 憄aid work� as the primary source of exploitation and societal inequalities. I will not get into the details of Van Parijs� theory here, for it is not the scope of this paper to discuss issues of exploitation in so far as they relate to labour. The essence of what is relevant to our discussion is that van Parijs regards basic equality as a prerequisite to real freedom. Real freedom requires formal freedoms (rights) and real opportunity to exercise those freedoms. 揟he worth or real value of a person抯 liberty depends on the resources that person has at her command to make use of her liberty.� [van Parijs, 14] Without a basic income, an individual may be forced to work at the worst of the menial jobs in order to survive. No stretch of the imagination could call this situation 慺reedom�. The solution is a Universal Basic Income (UBI). This income would be distributed equally to all individuals based on societal productivity surplus. This basic income would go a ways to funding necessities on which people can live thereby securing sustenance and allowing real freedom. This theory departs rather dramatically from the Rawlsian definition of distributive justice because it is arguably very egalitarian without being differentially distributive. By ensuring that all citizens are entitled to the same income, it takes quite literally everyone抯 equal right to a basic standard of living. Some may object that this distinction is simple semantics because if you followed the money trail back far enough, you could probably see that the wealthiest in a society end up receiving less in profit or paying their UBI back as tax under such a plan. The charge would be that this plan is still fundamentally distributive. However, the notion of rectifying inequalities is vastly different in this theory because rather than arguing that only the 憌orst off� benefits, everyone benefits. A small number of members of society may happen to find the marginal utility of such an income level rather laughable, but that is not the point. The point is that even the wealthiest would suddenly have the choice to stop working and even if they were to lose it all, they would still have secure income. Van Parijs� theory is quite simple in its logic but very radical in its proposal. In this theory, equality as a precursor to freedom is pushed to its max without getting into perfect egalitarianism. It is respectful of liberal freedoms, yet paradoxically disregarding a procedural aspect of justice. There is no veil here, no original position and no deliberative process. We also cannot say that it is a distributive argument in the traditional fashion, yet the principles behind distributive justice � a secure level of resource equality � are fulfilled. Walzer Walzer is similar to Rawls only in his desire to define justice in distributive terms and his definition of political justice as resolving social conflict over distribution: Human society is a distributive community. That抯 not all it is, but it is importantly that: we come together to share, divide, and exchange. We also come together to make the things that are shared, divided, and exchanged; but that very making � the work itself � is distributed among us in a division of labor匱he idea of distributive justice had as much to do with being and doing as with having, as much to do with production as with consumption, as much to do with identity and status as with land, capital, or personal possessions. [Walzer, 3] As we can see, although Walzer抯 view of justice is distributive, he looks at justice in an extremely different way than Rawls. He argues that if a person behind the veil is placed in the context of their own 揾istory, culture, and membership� it is unclear that they would be making the same choices. 揓ustice is a human construction, and it is doubtful that it can be made in only one way.� [Walzer, 5] Instead, he argues that the principles of justice are in fact pluralistic and that distributive justice should reflect this. In other words what is distributed will vary even within one society, along with how and why: 揹ifferent social goods ought to be distributed for different reasons, in accordance with different procedures, by different agents; and that all these differences derive from different understandings of the social goods themselves � the inevitable product of historical and cultural particularism.� [Walzer, 6] The most interesting part of Walzer抯 theory is his primacy of the social nature of goods. The constant debate amongst distributive theorists seems to be 憌hat should we be distributing?� Walzer provides useful insight by arguing that the worth of social goods depends only on how the society values them. This is a very valid point and is helpful in broadening the range of kinds of to be distributed beyond 憄rimary goods� as defined by Rawls, or income as defined by van Parijs. Diametrically, his realm of 憇ocial goods� is so very broad, it could encompass anything: grace, knowledge, wealth, office, rights, divinity, retribution. It is a very small list that would remain outside the domain of his social goods: Some domestic goods are valued for private and sentimental reasons, but only in cultures where sentiment regularly attaches to such objects. A beautiful sunset, the smell of new-mown hay, the excitement of an urban vista: these perhaps are privately valued goods, although they are also, and more obviously, the objects of cultural assessment. [Walzer, 6] Thus, Walzer says very little about the specific nature of the goods to be distributed other than they are social and need to be defined by the context of the society. He also has little to say about the specific way they should be distributed. All he suggests is that goods should be distributed more equitably - distributed in a way that domination and monopoly are reduced and 慶omplex equality� is achieved. Domination of a good is when it commands control over other social goods. Possession of, currently, money allows a person access to a wide range of other social goods. This in turn compounds the value of money as the dominant good because easy access to these other goods open doors to even more money, and so on. He calls this the 慶onversion process�. [Walzer, 17] The solution, therefore, lies in ensuring that no particular good holds dominance in this way as opposed to, in the Rawlsian fashion, a distribution of the monopolized good (money) more evenly across society (this would require constant state intervention and would not cut to the heart of the problem). Inequalities are inevitable and will continue to exist under complex equality, but the inequalities will not be compounded by a dominant good. Although Walzer argues that his theory is a distributive one, it is not clear whether he is advocating for egalitarianism at all or if he is just trying to reduce the most extreme differences while allowing for the particulars to be worked out at the local level. In some respects, this proposal is very appealing. Lessening inequality in a way that allows the people who live in a particular society and culture to decide the structure and the method of achieving distributive justice is respectful of non-liberal views of justice. He does not promote 憈he one true answer� but a general idea that may help societies. However, his guiding principles of distributive justice are intentionally empty of a substantive definition. Rather he proposes a very skeletal procedure, leaving the particular details up to the society. He does not argue specifically that egalitarianism is something that should be valued for its liberalizing effects. He does give us a hint at the method that should be used in achieving a just society, namely the lessening of the dominance of one social good, but it remains unclear to me as to where we are trying to get to with this. In short, Walzer argues for a distributive justice that is rather devoid of any great appeal to a largely equal society. He acknowledges the goods that are socially important without advocating a basic level of subsistence. This theory is, so far, the least appealing of the egalitarian justice authors. However, Walzer reveals the distinct weakness in Rawls� and van Parijs� theories: their restricted view of the value of goods as social. The social context could vastly affect the value of goods in a distributive theory and this needs to be accounted for. Nozick Libertarianism argues against distributive justice as traditionally defined. Nozick, for example, argues that justice in society hinges on the fair exchange of goods (private property) under a minimalist enforcer state. He 2calls this 搄ustice in holdings.� [Nozick, 46] The general outlines of the theory of justice in holdings are that the holdings of a person are just if he is entitled to them by the principles of justice in acquisition and transfer, or by the principles of rectification of injustice. [Nozick, 49] Thus, state government is not directly involved in the distribution of goods at all. Instead, distribution is handled by a fair transfer of goods in the market system. 揂 distribution is just if it arises from another (just) distribution by legitimate means. The legitimate means of moving from one distribution to another are specified by the principle of justice in transfer匴hatever arises from a just situation by just steps is itself just. The means of change specified by the principle of justice in transfer, preserve justice.� [Nozick, 47-48, emphasis added] The Nozick theory of justice is all about fair procedure and has very little to do with a substantive definition of justice. It is based on the freedom of the exchange of goods and equality in so far as everyone is equally free to transfer goods in the presumably fair and neutral market capitalist system. This theory argues that redistribution for bad-luck or circumstance is actually unjust to the people who are taxed to pay for such programs. The state is simply the enforcer of the 憆ules� and then, in this sense, might be said to be more of a distributor of retribution under transaction law. Justice is not about 憇tuff� but more about upholding people抯 right to non-interference. Thus, libertarian theory argues that we equally meet to exchange goods and the most important aspect of justice is freedom from interference. And as Rawls argues, 揷learly we cannot say that a particular state of affairs is just because it could have been reached following a fair procedure. This would permit far too much. It would allow one to say that almost any distribution of goods is just, or fair, since it could have come about as a result of fair gambles.� [Rawls, 75] It is supposed to be a dessert-based version of justice. But, as put so eloquently by David Held: The idea that modern society approximates卆 world where producers and consumers meet on an equal basis seems, to say the least, unrealistic when massive asymmetries of power and resource are卬ot only systematically reproduced by the market economy but also buttressed by liberal democratic governments themselves. [Held, p.260] In short, the procedure for distributing goods in libertarianism is not, in fact, fair and neutral. Equality in this theory is theoretical only and liberty is used as an excuse to allow domination by the strong and the lucky. This 憇urvival of the fittest� approach argues that the state should take a position of, as Kymlicka calls it, 慴enign neglect.� Thus, equality is not defined in any meaningful sense in Nozick抯 theory of justice and the strength of its 慸istributive� component is therefore in doubt. Should Justice be 慏istributive�? Theories of Justice Procedural Substantive Liberty Equality We can see how all four of these explored theories could purport in one way or another to have distributive elements. Basically, it would seem that anything could be argued in distributive terms: retribution, rights, basic goods, inclusion, holdings, etc. The question remains whether this broad of definition (i.e. Walzer抯) is useful in theorizing about justice? I would argue that it is not. The nature of a distributive theory should clearly, by definition, be about some basic level of resource equality as framed by Rawls and Van Parijs. There is no doubt that social conflict can arise over any social good not being distributed fairly, as Walzer has pointed out. However, when discussing fundamental questions of justice, it is a narrower range of goods that are of primary importance than 慳ll social goods� � distribution is about real equality. And as we have seen, the most valuable definition of equality is a positive one � one in which the state plays an active role in distributing primary goods. So this issue does not seem to be a case of not valuing distributive justice because there is controversy about what we should define as primary goods. The question of whether distributive justice is practically useful is slightly different than the question of whether it is theoretically the best way to frame justice. As we have seen, libertarianism also cannot provide any significant objections to justice as resource distribution because it cannot provide an adequate justification of the value of 憀iberty� over equality. As van Parijs confirmed, liberty is not meaningful in society if one does not have adequate resources to secure basic subsistence. Put another way, rights are only meaningful after a certain level of equality is secured. Procedural justice, on the other hand, raises some valuable concerns for a theory of substantive distributive justice. I would argue that proceduralism is also an intuitive conception of justice. The purpose of political justice is to resolve conflict and conflict is usually over equality of social goods � can抰 this be decided through an inclusive process? Substantive distributive justice comes from somewhere � if it doesn抰 come from a process, then where does it come from? Iris Marion Young is one procedural theorist who argues this point. Among other things, she argues that the only way to ensure that a society is just is if it has government mechanisms that are inclusive and representative of all citizens. Inclusion of difference is how just decisions and institutions are achieved: Group representation is the best means to promote just outcomes to democratic decision-making processes. The argument for this claim relies on Habermas抯 conception of communicative ethics. In the absence of a Philosopher King who reads transcendent normative verities, the only ground for a claim that a policy or decision is just is that it has been arrived at by a public which has truly promoted free expression of all needs and points of view. [Young 1995:191] This is a very valid objection to substantive justice. It questions why, for example, Rawls� conception of justice, his desire to make sure everyone has fair equal access to opportunities, is so much better than everyone else抯? Could it not be the case that my concept of justice as it exists right now would benefit immensely from perspective gained though intense conversation with 憃pponents�? 揟he test of whether a claim is just, or a mere expression of self-interest, is best made when persons making it must confront the opinion of other who have explicitly different, though not necessarily conflicting, experiences, priorities, and needs. As a person of social privilege, I am not likely to go outside of myself and have a regard for social justice unless I am forced to listen to the voice of those my privilege tends to silence. Group representation best institutionalizes fairness under circumstances of social oppression and domination.� [Young 1997: 264] Yet we must, again, stop and ask theorists such as Young why they insist on defining justice as inclusiveness and thus, distributing inclusiveness. If there is a reason we should be more inclusive, it cannot possibly be for the moral value of inclusiveness itself. Rather, it is probably triggered by visible injustices in society. An argument regarding the need to 慼ave women at the table� formulating the answers to questions of justice in society is important, but when asking 憌hy?� the answer never stops at 慴ecause it is valuable in and of itself to have women at the table�. The sufficient reason always comes back to inequalities evident in society � if the outcomes are not just and we need to question the process. As discussed in Rawls� theory, in the process of reflective equilibrium it is important to establish a fair procedure with truly equal individuals reasoning out questions of justice � but the process is not equivalent to 慾ustice�. There are many examples of state governments that rule by consent of the people and yet are doing what can only be described as unjust things to its people. Thus, the procedure under which these conditions have arisen is either not being followed properly, or is not a just procedure � and we know this because our independent sense of justice tells us so. Justice is what we want the end result to be and the process is how we propose to get there. Although justice is fundamentally substantive, Young raises very valid concerns about the value and reality of a society ruled by a Philosopher King. Legitimacy is still very important to a fair theory of justice. As we have seen, Rawls� theory is closer to the distributive justice side than the proceduralist side of the dilemma. His argument is that under pure proceduralism, there are no independent criteria to evaluate the justness of the outcome. The fairness of the procedure does not guarantee a just outcome � there must be something more. In the end, however, Rawls successfully balances the foundational substantive aspect of justice with the buttress of procedural legitimacy. Rawls was right to ensure that his reflective equilibrium took place under fair and equal conditions. 揂 society satisfying the principles of justice as fairness comes as close as a society can to being a voluntary scheme, for it meets the principles which free and equal persons would assent to under circumstances that are fair.� [Rawls, p.12] There must be limits to the value of legitimacy in defining justice. Yet Rawls recognizes that if he is going to rely on a hypothetical situation such as the original position to justify the two 慸iscovered� principles of justice, it is important to give this method the full credit it is due. In short, it seems that distinguishing distributive justice from procedural justice as an evaluative tool is only marginally useful because the two are, in fact, very complementary. Although distributive justice is a pragmatic theory of equality and therefore more useful when framed as a substantive theory, neglecting procedural and therefore legitimizing elements could be fatal. Van Parijs has a much more difficult time defending his theory against legitimacy concerns than Rawls who has a built-in legitimizing tool in the veil of ignorance. However, this distinction does help us to reaffirm that if we are forced to boil down a theory of justice into its foundational form, we must in fact see it primarily as a substantive, rational distributive theory and only secondarily as a procedural theory. Conclusion How you get to achieving justice in a society is very important. A society lead by philosopher kings is patronizing and potentially scary. Yet both the philosopher kings and the proceduralists recognize that equality is a natural starting point for political justice theories. Yet as we have seen equality is defined in very different ways by our authors: for some, equality means sameness or an equal chance to 憁ake it big� if you just work hard enough. History has proven that neither of these views of equality holds ground. Equality means fairness in the full sense of the word. No one should be disadvantaged by bad luck and no one should be privileged due to good luck. At the end of the day, equality derives from fundamental human moral worth � we all have an equal right to a chance to live the good life. Only once you have this basic resource equality requirement fulfilled can you exercise freedom in any meaningful sense. This is why much of the current discussion surrounding justice is defined in distributive terms. Very little is lost in thinking about justice as distributive. Given the fundamental inequalities pervasive even within the wealthiest countries of the world and the intuitive injustice of this fact, it is clear that distributive justice is a very relevant way of thinking about justice. If defined carefully as resource equality, this is the way justice should be defined for now. This will allow justice to have the proper focus and not get bogged down in the questions of 慼ow� we achieve it. Perhaps once a certain global level of resource equality is achieved, procedural elements can come back into the foreground. References Held, David. Models of Democracy, 2nd edition. California: Stanford University Press, 1996. Nozick, Robert. 揇istributive Justice�, in Philosophy and Public Affairs, Volume 3, Issue 1 (Autumn 1973), 45-126. Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1999. Van Parijs, Philippe. What抯 Wrong with a Free Lunch? Boston: Becon Press, 2002. Walzer, Michael. Spheres of Justice : a defense of pluralism and equality. New York: Basic Books, 1983. Young, Iris Marion. 揚olity and Group Difference�, in Theorizing Citizenship, Ronald Beiner, ed., New York: State University of New York Press, 1995. Young, Iris Marion. 揚olity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Idea of Universal Citizenship,� in, Contemporary political philosophy: an anthology. Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit, eds. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997. Endnotes PAGE PAGE 2 United Nations. Human Development Report � Human Development Indicators. Human Development Report 2002: Human Development Balance Sheet. Web: http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2002/en/indicator/indicator.cfm?File=index.html Last accessed, March 10, 2003. The World Bank Group. Poverty Net. Measuring Poverty: http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/mission/up2.htm. Last accessed, March 10, 2003. Statistics Canada. The Assets and Debts of Canadians: An overview of the results of the Survey of Financial Security, March 2001. http://www.statcan.ca/english/freepub/13-595-XIE/free.htm. Last accessed, March 12, 2003. Statistics Canada. Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics Profile Series. Aboriginal Peoples in Canada, June 2001, http://www.statcan.ca/english/freepub/85F0033MIE/free.htm. Last accessed March 10, 2003. I will also briefly introduce Iris Marion Young in order to present a strong procedural justice advocate. This is a term Will Kymlicka uses in 慚ulticultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights�, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. Kymlicka claims it is an adaptation of a term used by Nathan Glazer. I made this statement in the first paper required for this class. 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